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BANKRUPTCY REFORM: RELIEF FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
REGULAR INCOME
Pete Connors*
I. INTRODUCTION
The consumer debtor faced with insolvency is given two options
under the present Bankruptcy Act: (1) straight bankruptcy, and (2)
wage earner proceedings. In contrast to straight bankruptcy, which
is a liquidation oriented remedy, the debtor in a wage earner pro-
ceeding is not required to surrender any assets to the bankruptcy
trustee, nor is he actually adjudicated a bankrupt. On the contrary,
under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act (the wage earner sec-
tion), the debtor is given a means of repaying his debts from future
earnings under the protection of the court.2
The basic format of Chapter XIII is simple. After making a deci-
sion to use the relief provided by this chapter,4 the debtor aid his
attorney formulate a plan through which the debtor proposes to pay
off all or a portion of his debts from earnings. The plan is submitted
to both secured and unsecured creditors, who within the limitations
of the Act, are given the opportunity to accept or reject the sug-
gested plan. Upon acceptance by the requisite number of creditors,
* B.A., Catholic University, 1973; J.D., University of Richmond, 1976.
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. et seq. (1970). Citations to Title 11 shall be omitted.
References to the Bankruptcy Act shall be made by citation of the applicable section of the
Act rather than to the section of the United States Code.
2. Id.
3. The sections of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with wage earner proceedings are contained
in §§ 601-86. In addition, §§ 1-72 which deal with bankruptcy proceedings generally are made
applicable to wage earner proceedings through § 602 where such provisions are not inconsist-
ent. Many provisions of Chapters I-VII (§§ 1-72) and of Chapter XIII are made surplusage in
view of the Bankruptcy Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court which relate to procedure
under Chapter XIII. Statutory authority for the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Rules is
found in 28 U.S.C. § 2075 et seq. (1970).
4. Consumer debtors are responsible for the vast majority of all bankruptcy case filing.
Between fiscal years 1961 and 1972, they represented at least 90 percent of all bankruptcy
debtors. While the overall percentage of consumer debtors has decreased in subsequent years,
Chapter XH cases continue to encompass approximately 17 percent of all non-business
filings. During fiscal year 1975, the year in which bankruptcy filings reached their highest
level, over 41,000 Chapter XI petitions were filed. TABLES OF BANKRUPTcY STATIsTIcs, admin-
istrative office of the United States Courts, (unpublished report for fiscal year ending June
30, 1977).
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and compliance with certain other statutory requirements, the
bankruptcy court may confirm the plan, if convinced of its feasibil-
ity. Thereafter, all or a portion of the debtor's income is given to the
bankruptcy trustee who disburses it to creditors in accordance with
the plan. Upon completion of payments, a debtor will receive a
discharge from all debts affected by the plan whether the creditors
receive full or partial payment on their claims. If the debtor is
unable to meet his obligations under the plan within three years
after confirmation, a discharge will be granted only if he can show
that his failure to complete payments was due to exigent circum-
stances such as loss of job or illness. Although confirmation can be
attacked where fraud is involved, all creditors, whether or not they
have consented, are bound by the plan and any discharge granted
thereunder.5
The possibility of a massive restructuring of the present bank-
ruptcy system has been the subject of sqrious congressional inquiry
since 1968.6 While the major thrust of congressional proposals revis-
ing the current system has been directed toward other portions of
the law, there will be substantive changes which affect the present
wage earner section. This note will contrast the present bankruptcy
system with H.R. 82007, the final version of the Bankruptcy Reform
5. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 1 et seq.
6. S.J. Res. 100, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
7. BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT, H.R. 8200, as amended, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978)
[Hereinafter cited as H.R. 8200]. H.R. 8200 reflects the conclusion of a legislative process
which began with the establishment in 1970 of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States. S.J. Res.82 (Pub. L. No. 91-354, July 24, 1970, as amended). The final report
of the Commission prompted the introduction of its recommendation to reform existing
bankruptcy laws. A bill implementing its recommendations was first introduced in 1973 as
H.R. 10729, and S. 2563, 93rd Cong., 1st Session. Dissatisfaction with the Commission pro-
posal resulted in the introduction of a proposal offered by the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges. The latter was introduced as H.R. 16643, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Both bills were reintroduced in the 94th Congress where extensive hearings on bankruptcy
reform took place. H.R. 10729 was reintroduced as H.R. 31, and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). [Hereinafter cited as H.R. 31]. H.R. 16643 was reintroduced as H.R. 32 and S. 235,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). [Hereinafter cited as H.R. 32].
Extensive hearings continued in the House of Representatives and a synthesis bill H.R. 6
was introduced on January 4, 1977, to replace all prior proposals. H.R 6, 95th Cong., 1st
Session. This bill was marked up in Committee and later introduced as H.R. 7330, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. It was introduced on May 23, 1977, only to be modified again and introduced
as H.R. 8200 on July 11, 1977. Before its initial adoption by the House on February 1, 1978,
H.R. 8200 was amended and reintroduced.
Concomitantly, Senate discussion on bankruptcy reform focused on it3 own synthesis bill
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), with passage being accomplished on September 7, 1978.
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Act which was recently adopted by Congress and signed into law by
President Carter on November 6, 1978.8 Emphasis also shall be
placed on giving the practitioner some direction in choosing between
straight bankruptcy and wage earner proceedings under both bank-
ruptcy acts (i.e., the present Act, and the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978). Finally, Chapter 13 of H.R. 8200, which replaces Chapter
XIII of the present Act, will be reviewed in an attempt to summarize
the operation of this revised form of debt relief.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: H.R. 8200
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8200, 9
marks the completion of the first major overhaul of the bankruptcy
system in nearly 40 years. 0 Under the Reform Act, which becomes
effective on October 1, 1979," three structural changes to the pres-
ent bankruptcy system are envisioned. The first change enhances
the status of the bankruptcy court by both expanding its jurisdic-
tion," and providing for the appointment of bankruptcy judges by
the President with the consent of the Senate (rather than by judges
of the districts courts, as is the present practice). The second change
pertains to the adoption of a single consolidated reorganization
chapter unlike the present system which allows a debtor to file
Having two conflicting, although not wholly dissimilar proposals before Congress, Senate
leaders agreed to postpone indefinitely discussion on S. 2266 in favor of making all modifica-
tions necessary to resolve disputes over unsettled issues in the form of amendments to H.R.
8200. As finally adopted, H.R. 8200 was passed by the House on October 5, 1978, and by the
Senate on October 6, 1978.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598.
9. The Bankruptcy Reform Act is divided into four titles. Title I, which consists of only
Section 101, revises Title 11 U.S.C., thereby replacing that section of the Code dealing with
bankruptcy. Title II contains amendments to Title 28 U.S.C. These amendments set the
framework for the establishment of a new Bankruptcy Court (Section 201) and United States
Trustee System (Section 224). Title III contains conforming amendments to many other areas
of the Code affected by the Act. Finally, Title IV contains the transitional sections, with
Section 401 repealing the present Bankruptcy Act.
All textual references to H.R. 8200 shall be § 101 unless otherwise indicated.
10. The Chandler Act of 1938 is the basis for most of the law contained in the present Act
of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
11. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 402(a).
12. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 201, et seq. The bankruptcy court would be given jurisdiction
over all property of the estate without regard to who has possession of the property. Id. § 241.
(28 U.S.C. § 1471). Under the present Bankruptcy Act, the comprehensive grant of jurisdic-
tion imposed by § 2(a)(7) is qualified by § 23 which gives the courts of bankruptcy summary
but not plenary jurisdiction.
1979]
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under two or more chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, each of which
dictates differing substantive rights., 3 The third major change per-
tains to the enlargement of the role of the bankruptcy trustee and
the establishment, on a pilot basis, of a system of United States
Trustees under the control of the Department of Justice." The basis
for this change was the congressional attitude that bankruptcy trus-
tees, rather than bankruptcy judges, are better suited to administer
bankruptcy cases. 5 The major impact of this provision is that for
the first time responsibility for the management of a centralized
bankruptcy system will be divided between two branches of govern-
ment: the Executive Branch, through its central control over the
United States Trustee System, and the judicial branch, which will
retain the responsibility of settling disputes. As noted, the imple-
mentation of the U.S. Trustee System will be made on a pilot
basis. 6 At the end of a 5 year transition period, Congress will decide
whether to implement the system of U.S. Trustees or to terminate
the pilot program.'7
Chapter 13 of H.R. 8200 is entitled "Adjustment of Debts of an
Individual with Regular Income" and covers what is known as the
wage earner plan under Chapter XIII of the present Act.' As many
of the provisions dealing with ordinary liquidation proceedings
apply to Chapter 13 proceedings as well, one must also look to
Chapters 1, 3, 5 & 7 of H.R. 8200 for additional guidance concerning
Chapter 13 cases."5 Also, the provisions dealing with United States
Trustees for all cases have been aggregated in Chap-ter 15.20
13. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Part I at 237-48 (1973) [Hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT].
14. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 224 (28 U.S.C. § 586).
15. One of the difficulties with the present system revolves around the fact that bankruptcy
judges, without the aid of their clerks, presently spend as much as 22 percent of their time
in administrative matters. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
16. The ten pilot districts will be as follows: (1) Districts of Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island; (2) Southern District of New York; (3) Districts of Delaware
and New Jersey; (4) Eastern District of Virginia and District of Columbia; (5) Northern
District of Alabama; (6) Northern District of Texas; (7) Northern District of Illinois; (8)
Districts of Minnesota, and North and South Dakota; (9) Central District of California; and
(10) Districts of Colorado and Kansas. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 224.
17. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 408(b).
18. Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
19. Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 728.
20. Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 to 151326.
[Vol. 13:219
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With the exception of those changes regarding the confirmation
of proposed Chapter 13 plans, most of the changes relating to wage
earner proceedings are of a substantive rather than a procedural
nature. This stems from the assumption by the drafters of the Re-
form Act that Rules similar to the Chapter XIII rules adopted in
April 1973 by the Supreme Court will be promulgated. To be sure,
many of the matters covered by the 1973 Rules will have to be
modified with the enactment of H.R. 8200 since several procedural
changes have been made. Thus, complete reliance upon the existing
Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure would be unwarranted. 2'
1II. THE WAGE EARNER PLAN As AN ALTERNATIVE
For the attorney advising the non-business debtor, the decision to
initiate either straight bankruptcy or wage earner proceedings is an
important though not complex matter.2 2 The choice usually involves
balancing the advantages and disadvantages provided to the debtor
along with a consideration of his attitude toward the choice of relief
available. Factors in this decision should include the following: (a)
the degree of protection afforded the debtor's assets under state
exemption and homestead laws in straight bankruptcy proceedings;
(b) whether the petitioner had previously had a plan confirmed or
had received a straight bankruptcy discharge within the past six
years; (c) the extent to which certain debts will be exempt from
21. Section 247 of H.R. 8200, supra note 7, authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe rules
of practice and procedure for the bankruptcy courts. Rules promulgated will not be permitted
to be inconsistent with the statute, in contrast to the Rules promulgated under the present
Bankruptcy Act. See BANKRUPTCY LAW REvIsION - REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1977). [Hereinafter cited as
COMMITTEE REPORT]. Until new rules have been promulgated the transitional section provides
that the present Rules will govern to the extent they are not inconsistent with the bill. H. R.
8200, supra note 7, § 405(d).
22. Numerous attempts to force a wage earner into Chapter XIII proceedings have failed.
H.R. 127, H.R. 818, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964); S. Rep. No. 613, H.R. 613, H.R. 292, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See Adam, Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be Involuntary? 44
TEXAS L. REv. 533 (1966).
Clearly, these proposals would amount to little more than forced long term garnishments
with their attendant disadvantages. Where the debtor's motivation plays a significant role
in the success of such an arrangement, it is submitted that a mandatory wage earner provision
would be subject to inordinate difficulties. Nonetheless, under the proposed Act, individuals
would no longer be exempt from involuntary liquidation proceedings as they are now under
§ 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. On the other hand, individuals earning more than eighty per
cent of their gross income from farming would remain exempt. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, §
101, 11 U.S.C. § 303.
1979]
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discharge in straight bankruptcy; (d) the likelihood that secured
creditors will object to a plan which alters their rights; (e) the
debtor's ability to support a wage earner plan successfully; (f) the
stigma imposed by straight bankruptcy proceedings; and (g) the
extent to which the debtor feels a moral obligation to repay his
debts.
These are the principal considerations involved in advising a
client under the present bankruptcy system. Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, a number of these factors will be modified so as to
affect the ultimate decision involved in electing between straight
bankruptcy and Chapter 13 proceedings.
A. Exemptions
The decision to proceed under the wage earner section will often
be based on the amount of assets which are protected from liquida-
tion by state homestead and exemption laws. If a debtor has a
substantial amount of assets which would ultimately be turned over
to the trustee for liquidation in a straight bankruptcy case, a wage
earner plan should be seriously considered. 23 Under present exemp-
tion statutes, approximately 80 percent of all consumer bankrupt-
cies are, however, no-asset cases (i.e., cases where all assets are
either protected or are non-existent).24 This figure should increase
under the Reform Act as the debtor is allowed to choose between the
exemptions provided by either federal and state laws, 25 or those
23. On the other hand, if a large portion of one's assets can be protected by either exemp-
tion or homestead statutes, a debtor might be wise to consider straight bankruptcy (liquida-
tion) proceedings. There is no provision for this type protection under either Chapter XIII of
the present Act, or Chapter 13 of the Reform Act since neither Chapter contemplates the
surrender of assets.
Apart from this question, one should also be cognizant of the influence garnishment and
exemption statutes have on the overall rate of consumer insolvency. For example, states
which have totally exempted wages from garnishment such as Texas and South Carolina,
have enjoyed the lowest rates of non-business bankruptcy. COMmiSSION REPORT, supra note
13, at 49.
24. Statement of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr., Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
104 (1975) [Hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S.235 and S.236].
25. State laws vary substantially as to the amount and type of property which they protect.
For a survey of state exemption and homestead laws, see J. MEYERS, WI'E OuT Your DEBTs
AND MAKE A FRESH START 205-228 (1973).
The Virginia statutes provide the debtor with two exemptions: the homestead exemption
of $3500 available to heads of households, VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1970) as amended
[Vol. 13:219
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provided by the new national exemption-a minimum federal
homestead exemption of $7500 and a personal property exemption
of up to $2,550.21
The debtor's ability to select between the national exemptions,
and the exemption afforded by local law may be limited, however,
to the extent that the applicable state has elected to forbid use of
the former.? Irrespective of the applicable exemption,2 8 the debtor
is given the right to void any judgment lien to the extent of any
applicable exemption, as well as any non-purchase money lien on
certain types of personal property. 9 Each debtor in a joint petition
will be permitted to take the maximum personal exemption."' No
restriction exists, however, to require a spouse in a joint petition to
§ 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1975); and the "poor debtor's exemption," which is available to virtually
all debtors against selected household articles. Id. § 34-26.
26. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 522. Under this section, provision is made
for a minimum exemption of $400 in any form of property. In addition, other property
including livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade or
profession, and motor vehicles up to an aggregate amount of $2150 also are exempted. Any
unused portion of the homestead exemption may be added to the minimum exemption
referred to above.
The Reform Act also contemplates the exemption of many payments including social
security, pension, alimony and public assistance benefits which are akin to future earnings.
Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)10. Many of these exemptions are already allowed under federal
laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407 (social security payments); 45 U.S.C. § 352 (veterans bene-
fits). In the event the debtor does not opt for national exemption, these sources would be
exempt as being included under the category of other "federal laws." H.R. 8200, supra note
7, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
Cf. Uniform Exemption Act, 13 U.L.A., Civil Proc. and Rem. Laws, 1977 Pamphlet, which
generally restricts the debtors right to exemptions to specific items, with only a $1,500 allow-
ance in cases where the debtor did not qualify for a residential exemption.
27. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). The Rules of Procedure will
specify the manner in which the debtor may change his exemption from that of local law or
to the national exemption after he has filed his petition. COMmrrTEE REPORT, supra note 21,
at 360.
28. This section also specifies that the debtor or his dependent must list the property
claimed to be exempt. Cf. H.R. 32, supra note 7, § 4-503(1) in which failure to claim the
exemption in a petition would not cause the debtor to lose the exemption. The Act also
codifies the rule that the conversion by the debtor of non-exempt property into exempt
property, in the absence of actual fraud, shall not be grounds for denying a claimed exemp-
tion. COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 21, at 361. It seems questionable to contend that one
can attempt to take advantage of a property right afforded by law and still be said to have
acted fraudulently. See Forsberg v. Security State Bank of Canova, 15 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1926)(the debtor's trading of non-exempt property for exempt property for the purpose of
securing an exemption was held not to have involved an intent to defraud creditors).
29. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
30. Id. § 522(m).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
select the same exemption (i.e., local or national) which the other
spouse chose.
In some states, a previously filed bankruptcy petition will affect
a debtor's right to claim a property exemption. For example, in
Virginia, the homestead exemption3 is allowed only once during a
person's lifetime whereas the "poor debtor's exemption":" is allowed
each time a petition is filed. Like the "poor debtor's exemption" in
Virginia, the national exemption 3 would not be limited in use.
B. Availability of a Straight Bankruptcy Discharge
As under the current law, a debtor will not be eligible to seek a
discharge in straight bankruptcy until six years34 have passed from
any previous discharge.3 1 In contrast to the present Act, however, a
debtor seeking relief under the H.R. 8200 would be permitted to
obtain a straight bankruptcy discharge despite having obtained a
Chapter 13 confirmation during the period in which he would other-
wise be required to wait between straight bankruptcy discharges.
This would occur where either payments under the plan total at
least 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims, or in the alterna-
tive, where payments total at least 70 percent of the allowed unse-
cured claims in the case and the plan is proposed by the debtor in
good faith and is his best effort.36 Where the plan does not meet
31. VA CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Repl. Vol. 1970), as amended § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
32. Id. § 34-36.
33. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
34. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 14(c)(5), H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(8).
35. Other bankruptcy proposals, most notably, H. R. 32, supra note 7, .4-505(A)(7), called
for a five year waiting period, with a waiver provision where unforeseen circumstances such
as a major illness resulted in the debtors inability to pay his debts. Compare H.R. 8200, supra
note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (providing a discharge in special hardship cases under
Chapter 13 where the debtor has been unable to complete payments prescribed by the plan).
Cf. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). In Perry, the Court allowed a debtor
to have an extension plan confirmed where he had obtained a discharge in straight bank-
ruptcy within six years prior to the date of his Chapter XIII petition. Language in the case
indicated, however, that had the situation involved a debtor who had failed to complete a
Chapter XII composition plan (a plan where less than full payment is made on all claims) in
a subsequent straight bankruptcy proceeding, a discharge would not have been available. Id.
at 398-99.
36. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9). Since the question as to whether
a plan was the best effort may serve as a litigation issue in the event the debtor must later
use a Chapter 7 proceeding, it would be advantageous to include a clause in the Confirmation
Order indicating the court's review of this matter.
[Vol. 13:219
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these standards, if the debtor seeks a straight bankruptcy discharge
at a later date, the right to obtain a discharge will be restricted in
the same manner as if he had previously obtained a straight bank-
ruptcy discharge.
C. Dischargeability of Particular Debts In Straight Bankruptcy
Whether or not a particular debt is dischargeable in straight
bankruptcy can have considerable influence on one's decision to
choose between straight bankruptcy and a wage earner proceeding.
If a major debt is not dischargeable, the debtor will generally be wise
to use the wage earner proceeding to allow him to pay the debt over
the period of the plan.
Income taxes, as under the present Act, will be non-dischargeable
if returnable during the three years prior to the date of the filing of
the debtor's petition.31 Similarly, income taxes for which (1) the
debtor has made a fraudulent return, or (2) for which the debtor has
failed to file a return, or (3) for which he filed a return but the return
was not timely, such return being filed within two years of bank-
ruptcy,3 also will be non-dischargeable.
Likewise, the Reform Act continues present statutory law and
codifies existing case law with respect to the non-dischargeability of
debts obtained by false representation including those obtained by
false financial statements. It adds to the latter, however, the re-
quirement that any reliance upon the debtor's false financial state-
ment must have been reasonable.39 To avoid abuse of these provi-
sions by recalcitrant creditors, the court has discretion to award a
judgment for fees and other costs where this exception is alleged and
judgment is rendered in favor of the debtor."
37. Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A), Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 64(a).
38. Id. § 523(a)(1)(B). Likewise, debtors, with obligations in the form of educational loans
will be unable to seek their discharge if the first installment was due less than five years prior
to the date of the petition, or after the date of filing, unless the court finds that repayment
of the debt from the debtor's income would impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his
dependents. Id. § 523(a)(8). See State v. Wilkes, 394 N.Y.S. 849, 41 N.Y.2d 943 (1977), where,
in a curious decision, the New York State Court of Appeals held that an educational debt
which was forgivable on death or disability had not been discharged in a prior bankruptcy
proceeding as the debt was a contingent debt, not capable of being liquidated, and thus not
provable.
39. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 17(a)(2). H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
40. Id. § 523(d).
1979]
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In order for a debt to be discharged under the present Act, it must
be provable." This generally means that the debtor must show that
the debt can fall within one of nine categories of provable debts.
While a debt may initially fall within one of those categories, the
bankruptcy court may find that neither liquidation or estimation is
possible, or that the delay in obtaining such status would unduly
hinder the administration of the case. Should this occur, a debt
which is otherwise provable would be deemed to be non-provable
and, hence, no longer capable of being discharged in the proceeding.
Under the Reform Act, however, the concept of approvability has
been eliminated and all debts which are contingent or unliquidated
must be estimated if liquidation would unduly delay the closing
of the case. Accordingly, a discharge from both unliquidated and
contingent debts is now available. 2 Where such unliquidated debts
are a factor, it would seem that the debtor might select straight
bankruptcy as a remedy where he formerly would have been unwise
to do so.
D. Creditor's Approval
Under the present Act each creditor whose interest is secured by
personal property must accept any plan which affects his security
interest before the court may confirm a proposed wage earner plan.43
41. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 17(a), 63(a). Elmore v. Hill, 345 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Va.
1972).
42. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4)(A), 502(c). The requirement of §§
57(d) and 63(a) of the present Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, that, where otherwise provable,
contingent or unliquidated claims be estimated has been retained. H.R. 8200, supra note 7,
§ 101, 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
43. Under sections 651 and 652 of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, the debtor is author-
ized to obtain acceptances filed by creditors before or after the filing of his petition. If the
acceptances filed by creditors and those filed on creditors' behalf by the debtor are filed before
the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, together with those creditors who are deemed
to have accepted the plan, and such constitute all the creditors affected by the plan, then
the court may confirm the plan if otherwise acceptable under section 656. If not, only those
acceptances filed by the debtor on behalf of creditors filing claims before the conclusion of
the first meeting together with those acceptances filed by creditors who have filed claims,
and those creditors who are deemed to have accepted, will be counted in determining whether
the necessary number and amount of unsecured creditors required by § 652(1) have accepted
the plan. 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 13-202.04 (14th ed. J. Moore, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as COLLIERI. Section 652 requires acceptances by a majority in number of unsecured creditors
affected by the plan (which actually represents a majority in amount of such claims) and by
the secured creditors whose claims are dealt with by the plan.
Courts have interpreted the meaning of "affected" rather progressively. A plan that does
[Vol. 13:219
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While an adjustment to the value of the secured claim will be made
in the event of depreciation, acceptance by the secured creditor is
still required unless the plan does not include a provision for the
secured claim." In considering a proposed plan, however, it is un-
likely that a secured creditor will accept any plan which lessens the
priority he would receive in a liquidation proceeding."5 This is par-
ticularly true where the debt is one which a creditor can expect the
debtor to reaffirm if faced with the possibility of repossession.
Under such circumstances, the debtor is often forced to elect
straight bankruptcy or to propose a plan which avoids any reference
to a secured creditor who will not accept the debtor's plan. If the
bankruptcy court is willing to use its injunctive powers to discourage
creditors from repossessing the collateral," the debtor faced with a
substantial number of secured debts should still be advised to pro-
ceed under Chapter XIII. This advice is warranted even where the
debtor's plan avoids any reference to the creditor's claim in order
to receive the requisite approval of creditors. In this manner he may
be allowed to retain the collateral where it would otherwise be sub-
ject to repossession after a straight bankruptcy proceeding.
Under the Reform Act, both the secured and unsecured creditor's
situation is substantially modified. An agreement to affirm a debt
is enforceable only if made prior to the granting of the discharge and
if the debtor has not rescinded the agreement within 30 days after
not provide for the payment of any installments on a secured debt does not affect the debt
in such a way as to require the secured creditor to accept the plan even though the court
enjoins the enforcement of the secured creditor's right to possess the collateral. In Re Duncan,
33 F.Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1940). See also In Re Teegarden, 330 F.Supp. 1113 (E.D. Ky. 1971)
(a secured creditor was held not to be adversely affected by a plan if paid the present value
of his security in monthly payments).
44. A debtor can exclude a secured creditor from a plan by omission as specifically permit-
ted in § 646(a) and (6), or a secured creditor can exclude himself from the plan simply by
not accepting the plan under § 652(1). Thus, the notion, it is argued, that a secured creditor's
consent must be obtained is eliminated and any rejection by him will not bar confirmation
of a plan. This is the position espoused in Poulous, In Re Teegarden - Secured Creditors -
Standard for Determining When Affected, Based on Limitations of Due Process Rather Than
Contractual Terms, 46 AM. BANK. L.J. 165, 169-70 (1972).
45. The position of the secured creditor is further enhanced by the usual practice whereby
creditors lending money to consumer debtors will obtain a security interest on all of the
debtors assets, irrespective of the size of his own claim. CoMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 21, at
127.
46. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, §§ 614 and 658(2).
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it becomes enforceable." Where an individual debtor is involved,
the requirements for a valid reaffirmation are much more onerous."
The most meaningful appears to be the requirement that the debtor
appear at a hearing where he is to be given an explanation by the
court of his rights with respect to the debt.4 8 Thus, the likelihood of
an effective reaffirmation is significantly diminished.
Even more innovative is that no longer will creditor's approval be
a prerequisite to plan confirmation. 9 A plan will be confirmed by
the bankruptcy court upon a finding that the value of property to
be distributed in respect to unsecured claims is not less than the
amount that would be paid if the estate were liquidated, and with
respect to secured claims, if it finds that any one of the following
has occurred: (1) the debtor has accepted the plan, (2) the secured
creditor retains a lien securing the creditor's claim (during the pe-
riod of the plan), as well as receiving no less than the fair market
value of the collateral, or (3) the debtor surrenders the property
securing the claim." Because the drafters of the Reform Act have
balanced competing interests in favor of debtors seeking rehabilita-
tion in this situation, increased use of the wage earner section can
be expected.
47. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). Where individual debts are involved,
the following additional restrictions on reaffirmation have been added: (1) the reaffirmations
must not relate to a debt that is secured by real property, and (2) the court must approve
the agreement, as not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or hi. or her dependents,
as being in the best interest of the debtor, or having been entered into in good faith and in
the settlement of litigation commenced by the creditors to contest the dischargeability of the
claim, or was entered into in connection with the redemption of property under § 722. Under
§ 722, however, the debtor is given the right to redeem personal property intended for personal
family or household use which is either exempt or has been abandoned by the bankruptcy
trustee.
48. Id. § 524(d). Under existing case law a reaffirmation could be created without new
consideration. A valid reaffirmation only required an intent to repay the old debt. See cases
cited in 1A COLLIER, supra note 43, 17.33 n.4. By statute, the promise to repay is often required
to be in writing. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2.01 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
49. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324 and 1325.
50. Id. § 1325(a). The amount of the secured creditors claim will be limited to the fair
market value of the collateral. The remainder of the claim will be treated as an unsecured
claim. Id. § 506(a). Since § 1325(a)(5) provides for what is in effect mandatory acceptance
by secured creditors, where they receive value which is not less than the amount of such
claim, the question of what is fair market value is likely to become the focus of heated
disputes among the parties.
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E. The Plan's Feasibility
To support wage earner plans under both Acts, the debtor must
convince the court that his plan is feasible given his income and
contemplated payments. 5' Under the present Act, however, eligibil-
ity for Chapter XIII plans is limited to debtors who are wage earn-
ers, i.e., individuals whose principle income is derived from salary
or commissions.52 Likewise, this income is unavailable for use in
designing the debtor's plan where he also has employment related
income. Thus, a self-employed person cannot file, nor theoretically
can a person whose income is derived from a pension plan or social
security payments. 53
In one of the most significant changes with respect to Chapter 13
under the Reform Act, the term "wage earner" has been replaced
by the phrase "individual with regular income." Under this defini-
tion, a self-employed individual (including the small business owner
who formerly was restricted to Chapter XI) as well as an individual
whose income is derived from fixed sources such as retirement bene-
fits or welfare payments would be allowed to apply for relief under
this section. 4 If the income which is embraced under this expanded
definition represents an additional source of income, as where salary
of a spouse represents the main source of income, the amount of
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 656. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(6). The latter refers to the debtor's ability to make future payments under the plan.
It is not clear whether this is intended to place a higher burden on the debtor seeking
confirmation of his plan.
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 606(8).
53. Actually courts have been liberal in this construction of the phrase "wage earner". See
In Re Bradford, 268 F.Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (sole income was derived from social
security benefits); In Re Reed, 368 F.Supp. 615 (E.D. Va. 1968) (a carpenter who was paid
by the amount of work he produced, and for whom no one had been withholding income
taxes).
54. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 101(a). The definition does, however, limit
eligibility to individuals who, on the filing date, have non-contingent liquidated, unsecured
debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000.
The need for this provision arises from the expansive definition of individuals who are eligible
to participate under Chapter 13. Formerly self-employed individuals were confined to Chap-
ter XI arrangements. To insure that larger businesses proceed under Chapter 11, the Act
presumes that Chapter 13 is an inappropriate method of relief. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
21, at 119.
Also excluded from the class of eligible debtors are stock brokers and commodity brokers.
Here, the rationale is that they should be prohibited from using the customer protection
provisions of Chapter 7. Id. at 312.
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funds which can be used in designing a plan is increased." In this
manner, plans which heretofore might have been considered
"unfeasible" will now be acceptable for confirmation.
Although completion of the wage earner plan is not required
under current law within a specified time period, '" administrative
costs diminish the utility of plans longer than three years in dura-
tion. 7 Many debtors, however, will be unable to repay all creditors
completely within a three year period. Rather than designing an
extension plan which lasts longer than three years in order to meet
the requirement of feasibility, composition plans "8 which contem-
plate completion within three years should be a more suitable alter-
native. Although current interpretation of a section of the present
Bankruptcy Act has limited the use of composition plans, this situa-
tion is expected to change in view of the new provisions enlarging
the right to a straight bankruptcy discharge" (where debtors had
previously been under a Chapter 13 plan) and the restriction
whereby plans proposed under the Reform Act may only exceed
three years in duration in cases in which a special showing has been
made to the court.60
55. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 302(a).
56. Section 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, has often been misinterpreted to
include a requirement that plans be capable of completion within three years. (This section
allows a debtor to apply for a discharge after three years where he has been unable to complete
obligations contemplated under the plan). COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 160.
57. These costs include both trustee's and attorney's fees as well as reimbursement for
actual and necessary costs and expenses. In addition, a portion of all payments made by the
debtor is allocated to the referees' salary and expenses fund. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra
note 1, § 40(c)(2). Under the Reform Act, however, no portion of any payment is allocated to
this Fund. See note 123 and accompanying text infra.
58. A composition is a plan providing for payment of less than the full amount of debts
owed, with interest to the date of commencement of the case. This is in contrast to an
extension plan which provides for payment of the full amount of debts owed by the debtor
with interest to the date of commencement of the case.
59. See notes 35 and 36 and accompanying text supra. The dictum of Perry, supra note
35, seems to be the major reason why many plans are extensions which should be composi-
tions. Thus, the high mortality rate of wage earner plans. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13,
at 160-61. See also Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANK R. L.J. 160 (1975), showing that before changes were
made in wage earner plan implementation in Bangor, Maine, 95 percent of all plans were
extension plans of which 60 percent would generally fail. Under the new program, composition
plans were encouraged wherever appropriate. Experience under the new program reflects a
failure rate of 10 percent. Id. at 155-60.
60. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c).
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F. The Stigma of Straight Bankruptcy
In many cases, the wage earner plan provides an attractive alter-
native to straight bankruptcy and the resulting stigma on the dis-
charged debtor. The relative ease with which one may obtain credit
after a discharge in straight bankruptcy suggests, however, that the
stigma may be minor insofar as the "credit community" is con-
cerned.1'
It is possible that pressure from other sectors of the community,
namely friends, relatives, and neighbors, particularly in small com-
munities, may make the stigma a very real fact of bankruptcy.12
Apart from these social factors, some state laws, typically state
motorists responsibility laws, have discriminated against bank-
rupts, undoubtedly imposing another specie of stigma. Under the
Reform Act, any state law which discriminates against bankrupts
is prohibited. 3
G. The Moral Obligation
The wage earner plan, by permitting the debtor to repay his credi-
tors, affords the debtor a means of fulfilling his moral obligation
while avoiding the straight bankruptcy discharge which is often
perceived as unfair or even fraudulent to creditors. To the extent
61. One study of bankruptcy suggests that credit is made more available to Chapter XIII
debtors than to straight bankruptcy debtors. Nonetheless, credit is made available to about
50 percent of straight bankruptcy debtors. D. STANLEY & M. GimT, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM,
PROCESS, REFORM 64 (1974). This is explained by the fact that after discharge the creditor is
aware that the debtor will be given a "clean slate" and that he will be unable to declare
bankruptcy for a predetermined length of time. Compare Section 4-505(a)(7) of H.R. 32,
supra note 35 (another bankruptcy proposal), which permitted a waiver of its five year bar
to discharge provision where the court found that undue hardship would result to the debtor
by denying him the right to discharge, and the cause of his situation results from matters
not within his control.
62. See Haden, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans-Forgotten Man Bankruptcy, 55 Ky. L.J.
564, 605 (1967).
63. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 525. This section codifies the rule of Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), which held that a state motorists responsibility law was
violative of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it required that even
discharged bankruptcy debtors obtain releases from judgment creditors (where the initial
claim accrued from a motor vehicle accident) before suspension of an individual's drivers
license would be terminated. Compare, Elmore v. Hill, supra note 41, where the court re-
quired the suspension of the bankrupt's drivers license despite the discharge he had received
in bankruptcy where the claim involved was not provable for failure of liquidation. VA. Cona
ANN. § 46.1 - 459 (Repl. Vol. 1974); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, §§ 17, 63.
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that a debtor motivated by these feelings can complete payment
under a wage earner plan, such factors serve the decision making
process as effectively as most substantive considerations.
IV. H.R. 8200: CHAPTER 13 - ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS FOR AN
INDIVIDUAL WITH REGULAR INCOME
A. Commencement of Relief
Relief under Chapter 13, the new wage earner plan section, (now
called the Individual Repayment Plan) will be initiated by the filing
of a petition in the bankruptcy court according to the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. A petition may be an original petition or a
petition to convert from a pending liquidation case.'
H.R. 8200 provides that the Chapter 13 trustee will be responsible
for advising the debtor in the performance of his duties under the
plan, for the establishment of a feasible plan and for monitoring the
plan during the period of the extension . 5 Normally these functions
will be the responsibility of a standing trustee-that is, the trustee
to whom all Chapter 13 cases in the district are assigned. In areas
where there is no standing trustee, the private trustee will assume
these responsibilities, unless the district is one in which the pilot
program of United States Trustees is in operation, in which cases
these functions shall be performed by the latter. The delegation of
these functions is designed to enhance the role of the trustee in
Chapter 13 cases to more than that of a mere disbursing agent;
rather, he is entrusted with considerable responsibility for the suc-
cessful completion of the plan."
While most petitions under Chapter 13 will be original petitions,
provision is made for converting both voluntary and involuntary
liquidation proceedings into Chapter 13 plans.67 As noted earlier,
all individual debtors with the exception of farmers may be forced
into straight bankruptcy. If this occurs and the debtor is otherwise
64. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 706(a) and 1321.
65. Id. § 1302(c) and § 1502(c).
66. BANKRUPTCY REFORM Acr of 1978; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 139 (1978).
The trustees role, however, is limited to giving advice on matters of a non-legal nature.
67. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 706(a).
68. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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eligible, a petition may be filed causing conversion of the involun-
tary proceeding."
A husband and wife may file a petition jointly whether or not both
spouses are eligible to file under Chapter 13.1 This section modifies
current practice7' in that it broadens the case of eligible petitioners.
Thus, where one spouse cannot qualify, for whatever reason, if the
other spouse is a debtor with regular income, a joint petition can
still be filed. This section recognizes that the resources and expendi-
tures of both husband and wife in most instances will be essentially
the same.72
A plan may be filed with the debtor's petition "7 3 or within such
time as the Bankruptcy Rules prescribe.74 During the period which
follows the filing of the petition, however, the debtor will be pro-
tected by the provisions of the Act affording an automatic stay of
most debt collection actions.75
B. Provisions Relating to the Plan"
Three provisions are mandatory in all Chapter 13 plans submitted
for confirmation. First, the debtor must declare that he will submit
future earnings or income to the supervision and control of the trus-
tee. Through this provision, the trustee is allowed to exercise consid-
erable control over all income and expenditures of the debtor.77
69. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 706(a).
70. Id. § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), § 302.
71. CHAPTER XIII RULE 13-111. Presumably a provision comparable to section (b) allowing
joint administration of separately filed cases will be adopted.
72. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee of the Judiciary on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Part 3 at
1317, (1975-1976) (statement of Conrad Cyr). [Hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 321.
73. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1321.
74. COMMI"TEE REPORT, supra note 21, at 428.
75. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 362. The principal exception to this rule is
that the automatic stay will not operate against motions to collect alimony or to enforce
separation agreements. Id. § 362(b)(2).
76. Id. § 1322.
77. Id. § 1322(a). Unless the court actually requires the debtor to turn over his pay check
to the trustees, experiences from current practice indicate that this provision alone is not
particularly effective in promoting completion of plan. This is because a debtor frequently
may convey to the trustee an intent to fulfill his obligation, while actually he seeks delay of
payments required by the plan without formally modifying the plan. See Official Form 13-6
which includes a provision for making payments to the trustee either by the debtor or by his
employer.
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Most plans currently being confirmed in the Richmond area in-
clude an optional provision giving the court substantial control over
the debtor. This provision, which still may be popular after the
enactment of H.R. 8200, requires the debtor to obtain the court's
permission before becoming indebted in excess of $400. Failure to
obtain this permission may result in dismissal or conversion to
straight bankruptcy. Control such as this is justified by the fact that
new creditors may not be covered by the plan,78 nor may they be able
to levy on any of the debtor's assets without the court's permission. 7
Under the second mandatory provision, all claims entitled to
priority"0 under the allowance section must be paid in full under the
plan unless the holder of the claim agrees to different treatment.
Among the claims entitled to priority are taxes, and administrative
expenses incurred in the Chapter 13 proceeding.8'
A third and final mandatory provision requires that the plan give
the same treatment for any claims which have been placed in the
same classification.82
Of the provisions of Chapter 13 plans which will now be permissi-
ble, the following deserve special comment:
(1) the plan may provide for debts secured by real property only
if the real property is not the debtor's principle residence.,- The
benefit to debtor here is less than self-evident; perhaps a realization
78. CHAPTER Xm RuLE 13-305, under the present law, and H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101,
11 U.S.C. § 1305 under the new law, govern the allowance of post-petition claims.
79. Under these provisions, taxes which arise after filing of the petition, and debts neces-
sary for the performance of the plan, are allowable post-petition claims. Obviously, the latter
require the court (or under the new Act, the trustee) to evaluate the circumstances surround-
ing the incurrence of the obligation. While it would appear that an expre.s provision for post-
petition claims is unnecessary, inclusion of a provision such as that described above is well-
advised. As to the debtor, such a provision serves to remind him that post-petition debts will
normally not be allowable-that is, during the period of extension, he must live within the
budget he has established. Similarly, it serves to remind him of the cancerous consequences
of credit splurging while he is under the plan. As to the court (or under the new Act, the
trustee), such a provision lessens the need for its supervision thereby eliminating an otherwise
inflexible situation.
80. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, §§ 611, 658(2). Hallenbeck v. Penn. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963). H. R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 362, as
noted, continues this treatment.
81. Id. § 1322(a)(2). See 26 U.S.C. § 7122 (1954), allowing the Secretary of Treasury to
compromise tax claims whenever liability or collection appears uncertain.
82. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
83. Id. § 1322(b).
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that most of these debts could never be completed within the plan
period prompted a provision for curing of defaults on such prop-
erty,"4 in favor of dealing with them directly in the plan. In any case,
this treatment continues that of current law.&5
(2) the plan may provide for classification of claims into groups
which do not discriminate unfavorably against any particular
class.8 This is in recognition of the need for an option in the way
claims of varying creditors are to be treated. This presents a marked
departure from current law7 where, for example, unsecured credi-
tors are to be treated in the same manner. Thus, the debtor may
have suffered substantial medical expenses not covered by insur-
ance. Yet, his other unsecured debts may not be so intolerable. In
drafting his plan, it would be permissible to classify his unsecured
debts into two groups: one relating to medical bills, and a second
covering all other unpaid debts. Under the plan, a different pay-
ment schedule could be provided for each class as long as all debts
within the same class receive the same treatment.8
(3) the plan may use the property of the estate to provide for
payment of claims against the debtor.8 This would include using
exempt property or property on which there is a secured claim where
the creditor has been otherwise satisfied.
In drafting the debtor's plan, counsel is encouraged to provide for
as much flexibility as possible. The provision discussed above,"
allowing the debtor to obtain credit without obtaining prior ap-
proval in all cases, is but one example of the type of provisions
suggested. Another appropriate provision would allow the debtor to
84. Id. § 1322(b)5. See 124 CONG. REC. Hll106 (daily ed., Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
85. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 606(1).
86. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1).
87. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 646(1).
88. Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, supra note 72, Part 3 at 142. Similarly, claims
necessary for the performance of the plan which have been allowed as post-petition claims
should be classified with those claims which are required to receive immediate payment under
the plan (i.e.; administrative expenses). See H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. §
364(b), § 507(a)(1), § 1328. While it would appear that the authority to include such claims
in the plan as administrative expenses would be limited to the situation where the trustee
has incurred the debt, such a clause would seem to be permissible under either §§ 503(a) or
1322(b)(10). Id.
89. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8).
90. See notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text supra; see also note 88 supra.
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be granted a moratorium in making payments under the plan with-
out having to apply to the court for permission. Here, the danger to
be avoided would be a creditor's attempt to assert his right to have
the case dismissed or converted to a liquidation proceeding.' Provi-
sion also should be made for the trustee to decide whether such
action is desirable under certain restricted guidelines. Likewise, the
debtor may be in a predicament whereby a moratorium is not effec-
tive, and the only realistic solution is to provide for obtaining funds
which have reached the hands of the trustee. Again, a clause in the
plan allowing such action without the need to obtain court approval
would be appropriate.
As noted earlier, 2 the Reform Act changes present law by impos-
ing a time limit under which all plans must be completed. The plan
may not permit payment over a period exceeding five years, and
periods in excess of three years may only be granted with court
approval.
C. Protection of Creditors
The first meeting of creditors93 affords the creditor an opportunity
to confront and, if necessary, interrogate the debtor. 4 In a signifi-
cant departure from present law, however, the new Act provides
that the bankruptcy judge will not be present at this hearing.
Rather, the first meeting will operate like a deposition session, with
the debtor's attorney, or the trustee presiding. Objections made to
claims will be resolved by the bankruptcy judge at a later hearing. 5
In its attempt to facilitate practice, the Reform Act follows the
present Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure by allowing all claims pro-
perly filed unless objected to by a party in interest. 6
At the hearing on confirmation the court tests the debtor's plan
against the statutory requirements of Chapter 13 to determine if the
plan should be confirmed. The standards for confirmation have
91. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
92. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
93. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 341(a).
94. Id. § 343.
95. Id. §§ 341(c), 502 (b). See 124 CONG. REC. S17432-3 (daily ed. Oct. '3, 1978) (statement
of Sen. De Concini).
96. CHAPTER XIII RuLE 13-307(b). H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U .S.C. § 502(a).
97. Id. §§ 1324 and 1325. After hearing any objections filed within the time so fixed, the
court shall confirm a plan if all fees and charges then required pursuant to section 123 of title
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been substantially borrowed from the present Act' in that compli-
ance with the procedural requirement is only effective where feasi-
bility can be shown. The provision of the present Act"9 requiring that
confirmation of the plan be denied if the debtor has done any acts
which would bar a discharge under a straight bankruptcy proceed-
ing has been eliminated. The rationale is that creditors are better
served by allowing the debtor to attempt to repay the debt; more-
over, the fact that he has forfeited his right to a straight bank-
ruptcy discharge may actually provide him with greater incentive
to perform under the plan. 0 °
At this hearing the court also will consider the objections of credi-
tors. In contrast to the provisions of the present Act denying confir-
mation of a proposed plan until it has been accepted by a majority
in number and amount of unsecured and, secured creditors
"affected" by the plan, and by all secured creditors whose claims
are dealt with by the plan, creditors will have only limited input in
determining whether or not a proposed plan will be confirmed. As
noted earlier,'0 ' it will be possible for a plan to be confirmed without
the approval of creditors so long as the court is convinced that all
claims are dealt with adequately under the plan.
D. Post Confirmation Procedures
A confirmed plan will be binding on all creditors.'' Creditors will
be barred from attacking the provisions of a confirmed plan even
where they have been unable to participate in the proceedings lead-
ing to confirmation. In addition, the court may use its injunctive
powers to prevent harassment by creditors who continue to seek
enforcement of their pre-confirmation rights.'0 3
Likewise, in an effort to protect the debtor during the period of
28 U.S.C. and all amounts then required pursuant to the plan have been paid, if the court is
satisfied that the provisions of the Chapter have been complied with, that the plan has been
proposed in good faith, that the provisions for secured and unsecured creditors (discussed at
notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra), are adequate and that the debtor will be able to
meet payments under the plan.
98. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 656.
99. Id. § 656(a)(3).
100. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, Part 2 at 208.
101. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
102. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1327.
103. Id. § 362.
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the plan, the drafters of the Reform Act have sought to remedy a
problem under the present Act whereby a co-obligor or co-surety
could exert pressure on the debtor in the situation where the former
has been compelled to pay off the petitioner's debts by creditors who
are unwilling to wait for payment pursuant to the plan.,04 Therefore,
Chapter 13 provides for a moratorium on collections from co-debtors
(by creditors) until the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to one
for liquidation.' 5 During this period, however, the creditor will be
protected against both the expiration of the statute of limitations
on his action against the co-debtor, 0 as well as the deterioration of
collateral, if any, securing his obligation.'0
Notwithstanding this protection, it may become apparent that
the debtor will be unable to fulfill his obligations under the plan. If
this problem does arise, the debtor may apply to the court for modi-
fication of the plan, including if necessary, the permission to convert
an extension plan into a composition plan.' 8 Thus, the Act has
attempted to encourage completion of a debtor's commitment
whenever possible.
On the other hand, after confirmation the debtor may also apply
to the court for the purpose of seeking a dismissal of the case or of
a conversion to a liquidation proceeding.' 9 The court at any time
may also dismiss the case, or convert it to a liquidation proceeding
whenever it is in the best interest of creditors or of the estate." The
debtor's failure to pay fees and charges, material default of the
provisions of the plan by the debtor, and among others, unreason-
able delay by the debtor which is prejudicial to the creditors is
sufficient cause under the Reform Act for the court to dismiss the
104. COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 21, at 121-23.
105. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1301. This provision if; limited in applica-
tion only to consumer type debts. Id. § 1301(a).
106. Id. § 108(c).
107. Id. § 1301(c)(3).
108. Id. § 1329. Despite common parlance, the drafters have avoided any reference to plans
as either "extension" or "composition" plans. Here reference is made simply to modifying
the plan within the guidelines set forth under §§ 1322 and 1325.
109. Id. § 1307(a), (b). The right to convert to a rearrangement proceeding is limited to
the period preceding confirmation of the plan. Id. § 1307(d). The right to) request conversion
to a rearrangement proceeding is given to any party in interest. Both the broader discharge
provisions (discussed at note 127 infra) and the convenience afforded by Chapter 13, in
contrast to that of Chapter 11, require that such conversation be avoided.
110. Id. § 1307(a).
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case or to require that it be converted to one for liquidation.",
Within 180 days after the order granting confirmation of the plan,
a party in interest may raise the question of fraud in the procure-
ment of the plan. The court will hold a hearing on notice to all
parties in interest."' If after the hearing, the confirmation is set
aside, the court may proceed to either dismiss the case or convert
the case to one for liquidation. At this time the court also may
receive proposals of the debtor to modify the plan. If the debtor's
modified plan is confirmed, the debtor will follow the procedure
outlined in sections 1323 through 1325 for obtaining confirmation of
a modified plan. If the proposed plan is not confirmed, the court
may either dismiss the case or convert it to one for liquidation. This
is the procedure even where a converted liquidation case is in-
volved.113
E. Claims and Distribution
As under present law, in order for a claim to be allowed, a proof
of claim for each debt will be required to be filed, whether it be by
the debtor, creditor, or trustee."1 Generally, the creditor seeking
payment of his claim will file the proof of claim. A claim will be
discharged notwithstanding the failure to file a proof of claim, so
long as the debt is provided for in the debtors plan."5
Because the date of the petition is the date for the determination
of claims,"' interest will be limited to that amount which had ac-
crued at that time. However, certain claims will be allowed even
where liability has accrued after the date of the petition: (1) claims
111. The court also has this power before confirmation of the plan. This conforms to
CHAPTER XI RuLES 13-112 and 13-215. It improves the former, however, by substituting "the
debtors failure to prosecute the proceedings" with "unreasonable delay prejudicial to credi-
tors" as a possible grounds for dismissal or conversion prior to confirmations.
112. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1330.
113. Under the present rules of procedure, if the debtor (whose plan has been revoked for
fraud) has filed his petition in a pending straight bankruptcy case, and the modified plan is
not confirmed, the court shall enter an order directing that the pending bankruptcy case
proceed. Where an original Chapter XIII proceeding is involved, however, the court may
dismiss the case or adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt without his consent. Where fraud is not
involved, however, the debtor in an original Chapter XI proceeding cannot be adjudicated
a bankrupt without his consent. CHAPm= XIII RuLE 13-215.
114. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
115. Id. §§ 1328(a), 502(a), 727(b) (for liquidation cases).
116. Id. § 502(b)(2).
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arising from executory contracts and unexpired leases, which have
been rejected;"7 (2) claims for taxes which arise after the date of the
petition;"' (3) claims which are the result of the debtor's needs for
property or services required by him to assure proper performance
of the plan;"' and (4) claims for property recovered under the prefer-
ence avoiding powers of the trustee, where applicable.'2 1
In order for the Chapter 13 program to be moderately self-
supportive and for attorneys, whether in their capacity as represent-
ative of the debtor, or as the bankruptcy trustee, to be willing to
practice under this section of the Act, it is imperative that the
debtor be sincere in meeting obligations to these groups. For this
reason, certain claims will be given priority before remaining credi-
tors can receive dividends under any plan. Priority of payment
under this section' 21 is given to the actual necessary' 2 costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, compensation and reimbursement
awarded to officers of the estate,'2 3 including both the trustee, and
117. Id. §§ 365, 502(g). This right is particularly powerful in that it gives the trustee
authority to revise contracts even where those contracts have anticipated the possibility of
insolvency by the debtor. For a discussion of this power under the present Act, see Country-
man, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MiN. L. RE v. 439 (1973). In rejecting or assum-
ing executory contracts, or unexpired leases, the trustee must act before confirmation of the
plan. Consistent with present law on this matter, H.R. 8200 rejects the proposal of H.R. 32,
supra note 7, § 4-602(a)(1) which mandated a sixty day limitation period in which the
decision to act affirmatively, was required to be made. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11
U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
118. Id. § 1305(a)(1).
119. A claim arising under this section will not be allowed if the holder of the claim knew
or should have known that prior approval by the trustee of the debtor's incurring of the
obligation was necessary, and seeking such approval was practicable, and approval was not
obtained. Id. § 1304(c).
120. Id. §§ 502(i), 550.
121. Id. §§ 507(a)(1), 1325(a)(2), 1326(a)(1).
122. Under CHAPTER XIII RULE 13-106(6)(1), the debtor can apply for permission to pay
the filing fee in installments. If this occurs, the court may authorize payment of the install-
ments in the plan or otherwise.
Under H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 727, failure to pay filing fee has been
eliminated as a bar to discharge in liquidation proceedings, thus eliminating the impact of
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), in which the Supreme Court denied the debtor
the right to file bankruptcy in forma pauperis. For reasons which should be readily apparent,
no parallel provision has been added under Chapter 13. In this regard, it should be observed,
that the court may require the debtor to pay the filing fee before confirmation. H.R. 8200,
supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2).
123. Id. § 503(b). This represents a departure from current law in that priority of payment
for a portion of the bankruptcy judge's salary, which would be paid into the Referees Salary
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attorneys representing the debtor.'24 Where the United States Trus-
tee serves as trustee, the compensation to which a trustee is nor-
mally entitled is to be paid to the United States treasury.'2
F. The Discharge
On completion of all payments specified by the plan, the debtor
will be granted a discharge on all debts provided for by the plan as
well as those which were not allowable as claims against the estate.
The effect of the discharge will be the same whether granted in
accordance with a composition or an extension plan."6 The dis-
charge granted under Chapter 13 is more comprehensive than that
contained in liquidation proceedings in that the only exceptions to
discharge are alimony, maintenance and child support obligations.
Thus, filing a Chapter 13 plan can result in the debtor obtaining a
discharge on debts which would not have been dischargeable if he
had filed under the liquidation sections.' 21
If completion of the plan is not possible, the debtor may apply at
any time for a discharge providing he can show that his failure to
complete payments was due to circumstances arising after confir-
mation for which he is not responsible. This provision'2 departs
from the present Act'29 which requires the debtor to wait three years
before making such a request. Thus, the alternative, before the
three year lapse, had been to apply for a dismissal or a conversion
to straight bankruptcy unless modification was acceptable. Under
the new Act, the debtor need only show the court that modification
of the plan is not feasible. If a discharge is granted under this sec-
and Expense Fund, has been eliminated. This represents the general agreement that the
bankruptcy system no longer need to be completely self-supporting. COMmTrE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 187, 540.
124. This continues the policy of Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, § 659(4), and Bankruptcy
Rule 219 under which the court is allowed to scrutinize the compensation received by the
debtor's attorney for his services. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 328. In Rich-
mond, the Bankruptcy Court has adopted $400 as the ceiling for attorney's fees in wage earner
proceedings. Local Rule 5(d), Bankruptcy Court, Richmond, Virginia. The expansion of the
role of the standing trustee, who now must perform debtor counseling services, may produce
an even lower standard fee.
125. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 15324, § 15330.
126. Id. § 1328(a).
127. Cf. §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a).
128. Id. § 1328(b).
129. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 661.
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tion, however, it would only be effective with respect. to unsecured
claims which are not exempted from discharge. Thus, the Chapter
13 "hardship" discharge is less comprehensive than the discharge
obtainable had the debtor completed payments pursuant to the
plan. 30
G. The Trustee
Whenever the number of Chapter 13 cases justifies the practice,
the court will appoint a trustee to whom all Chapter 13 cases will
be assigned. In other cases, the court will appoint a private standing
trustee.' 3' Furthermore, the new Act fails to incorporate legislative
proposals whereby creditors would have been permitted to elect a
trustee in lieu of a standing trustee.' 32
In those pilot districts where the U.S. Trustee System will be in
operation, the U.S. Trustee will appoint the standing trustee, and
will serve as trustee in all cases where the number of Chapter 13
cases does not justify the use of a standing trustee.'1 In the pilot
districts, the U.S. Trustee will assume full responsibility for super-
vision of the performance of all standing trustees and is empowered
to remove a trustee from office for cause.' 34
130. Cf. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2), and 1:328(a)(2).
131. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
132. As originally drafted, § 1302(a) permitted creditors to elect a trustee in Chapter 13
cases in the same manner as other cases. The justification lying in that Chapter 13 was no
longer limited to wage earners; rather, debtors owning small businesses could also qualify.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 21, at 106. Legislative history for the sudden change, however,
is lacking although cause may in part be found in the amendment to § 341(c) of H.R. 8200,
supra note 7, § 101, which permits the first meeting of creditors to be conducted by the
bankruptcy trustee. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
133. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 151302(a)(1).
134. Id. § 224, 39 U.S.C. § 586(b). The compensation of the trustee under the present Act
is limited to 5 per cent of the total payments made under all plans. It is further limited so
that the maximum compensation of a trustee shall not exceed the maximum compensation
of a full-time bankruptcy judge. Guidelines for Chapter XIII Administration prescribed by
Judicial Conference Memorandum, No. 346, Supplement No. 4, April 21, 1972. See also
Advisory Committee Note, CHAPTER XIII RULEs 13-201, 13-209 and Bankruptcy Act § 659(3).
Section 326(b) of H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, also limits the compensation of the trustee
to 5 per cent of all payments made under the plans which he handles. At least one commenta-
tor has suggested, however, that the trustee should be given a salary based on the caseload
he handles. Senate Hearings on S.235 and S.236, supra note 24 (statement of Hon. Joe Lee).
[Vol. 13:219
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
H. Property of the Estate
The new Act includes both a definition of the property included
within the debtor's estate and, in addition, provides various rights
for the debtor with respect to the estate which it establishes.
The estate now includes both property and income from services
acquired after the commencement of the case. 35 The debtor is to
remain in possession 36 of the property of the estate and is given the
right to act independently of the trustee in many transactions. Such
transactions include the right to use, sell or lease property in other
than in the ordinary course of business after adverse parties are
given notice and hearing. The debtor must, subject to limitations
discussed earlier, 37 obtain approval before he incurs credit that he
expects to have included in the plan.'
Furthermore, where the debtor is self-employed and incurring
trade credit in the production of income,'39 the debtor, unless other-
wise specified by the court, is given the exclusive right to use prop-
erty held under leases, or which is subject to a lien, during the
pendency of the case,4 0 and in addition, he is allowed to sell, or
lease property in the ordinary course of business without the need
for obtaining the permission of either the trustee or the court. The
self-employed debtor also is permitted to negotiate for and obtain
credit necessary for the functioning of his trade or business. The
provisions for the self-employed debtor closely resemble those provi-
sions available to the debtor in a rearrangement proceeding under
135. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 1i U.S.C. § 1306(a). The statutory pattern reflects a
curious omission: the debtor's plan may use all sources of income so long as the stream is
sufficiently regular and predictable. Within that category would conceivably fall both social
security income and guaranteed payments. Yet, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
future income is limited to "earnings from services performed by the debtor." Compare the
treatment under the present Bankruptcy Act, supra note 1, §§ 70(a) (definition of property
of the estate), § 611, and § 658(2) (both defining the court's jurisdiction over the debtor's
property in Chapter XIII cases.)
136. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b).
137. Id. § 1303.
138. Id. § 1305(c). See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
139. Id. § 1304(a).
140. H.R. 8200, supra note 7, § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c). The right to use, sell or lease is
restricted to non-cash collateral. Id. § 363(a).
141. Id. §§ 1304(b), 363(b).
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Chapter XI of the present Bankruptcy Act where no receiver has
been appointed.'
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Whether the number of wage earner proceedings increases with
the enactment of H.R. 8200 will not be a true indication of its
success. Many debtors, particularly where no-asset cases are in-
volved, cannot be expected to benefit from this type proceeding. For
this reason, inquiry should be made into whether the Act has pro-
vided a remedy accessible by the type of debtor it has been designed
to aid.
Under the Reform Act, the debtor confronted with the prospect
of insolvency has a path leading to relief that is well defined, if not
in fact cushioned with inducements of nectar. It is evident that the
drafters have emphasized a public policy approach that opts in
favor of the debtor seeking some form of relief, whether it be in the
form of a "fresh start" or "rehabilitation," rather than one which
favors the interests of creditors seeking realization of their claims.
The latter, it would seem, should have little cause to complain, for
the equities underlying consumer bankruptcies can only be said to
have been recognized.
142. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 1, § 342. These provisions follow from the changes
expanding eligibility for wage earner proceedings to the self-employed. See Hearings on H.R.
31 and H.R. 32, supra note 72, Part 3 at 1324, 1414.
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